

Specification



OpenPEPPOL AISBL



**Transport Infrastructure
Coordinating Community**



ICT - Models



**PEPPOL Policy for Transport
Security**

Author:

Bård Langøy, Pagero, Sweden

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Contributors

Bård Langøy, Pagero

Hans Berg, Tickstar

Risto Collanus, Visma

Philip Helger, Bundesrechenzentrum

Jerry Dimitriou, OpenPEPPOL Operating Office

Jesper Larsen, OpenPEPPOL Operating Office

Erlend Klakegg Bergheim, Difi

Version History

Version	Date	Change log
1.0.0	2019-01-31	Initial version

1 Introduction

Actors within the PEPPOL eDelivery Network are required to manage two different types of electronic certificates:

1. TLS certificates, used on transport level to provide a standard solution for securing server authentication and message confidentiality.
2. OpenPEPPOL certificates, used on application level, to secure that only authorized and approved actors are operating within the PEPPOL eDelivery Network.

The TLS Certificates are not provided by OpenPEPPOL and MUST be issued by third party Certificate Authorities.

This document covers the policies on the use of TLS certificates and TLS configurations in order to:

- limit disruptions in traffic between actors
- provide good security requirements for both current and future demands

1.1 Terminology

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

The term TLS is used through the entire document instead of SSL to highlight the fact that the TLS protocol is the successor of the SSL protocol.

21 1.2 Normative references

- 22 [RFC2119] Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,
23 <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt>
- 24 [NSS] Mozilla Network Security Services,
25 <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS>
- 26 [CACERTS] List of pre-loaded CA certificates of NSS,
27 https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Included_Certificates
- 28 [SSL-LABS] SSL Labs Website performing SSL tests,
29 <https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest>

30 2 Policy for Transport Security

31 2.1 Approved Certificate Authorities

32 TLS Certificates are not issued by OpenPEPPOL and would lead to security risks and trust issues
33 between actors without any guiding policies. Trust issues have already been a problem within the
34 PEPPOL eDelivery Network for quite some time and to solve these issues, OpenPEPPOL restricts
35 the usage of TLS Certificates as follows:

36 **POLICY 1 Approved Certificate Authorities**

37 Each TLS certificate used in the PEPPOL eDelivery Network MUST be issued (directly or indirectly) only by a
38 root certificate contained in the latest version of the “List of pre-loaded CA certificates” [CACERTS] of the
39 “Mozilla Network Security Services” [NSS].

40 It’s the responsibility of the actor in the PEPPOL eDelivery Network to use a TLS certificate that
41 adheres to this policy and to verify that only TLS certificates adhering to this policy are allowed to
42 connect.

43 **POLICY 2 Self-signed certificates**

44 Self-signed TLS certificates are not allowed.

45 Self-signed TLS certificates are not allowed, because man-in-the-middle-attacks could be
46 performed unnoticed.

47 2.2 TLS Requirements

48 TLS configurations SHOULD be constantly updated in order to keep the PEPPOL eDelivery Network
49 secure. TLS configurations covers areas like:

- 50 • Software versions (security patches)
- 51 • Hash algorithms
- 52 • Key exchange algorithms
- 53 • Certificate requirements
- 54 • Cipher suites

55 **POLICY 3 TLS Configuration Requirements**

56 The TLS configuration MUST constantly be of at least grade ‘A’ according to SSL Labs [SSL-LABS].

57 To address the fact that requirements to keep the TLS configurations up-to-date, without having
58 to re-issue this policy frequently, the third-party analysis tool offered by SSL Labs is used to verify
59 the TLS configuration.

60 Every actor graded below "A" in SSL Labs is considered to be "unavailable" with regards to the
61 Transport Infrastructure Agreement.

62 Note: this applies to all AccessPoints, for all transport protocols supported in the PEPPOL eDelivery
63 Network (AS2 and AS4 at the time of writing of this document). This also applies to all SML
64 instances. SMP instances are currently not affected because they are not using TLS certificates.

65 2.3 Customizations to TLS configurations

66 **POLICY 4 Customizations to TLS configurations**

67 TLS configurations **MUST NOT** be modified in order to allow communication with actors violating
68 the policies of this document.

69 If an actor breaks at one or more of the policies stated in this document it **SHOULD** be reported to
70 OpenPEPPOL Operations.

71 If an actor breaks at one or more of the policies stated in this document it **MUST NOT** lead to
72 configuration changes for communicating with that specific actor.