

Working progress – for discussion only



Peppol Security Requirements Design Work Group

Extraordinary Peppol SP Community Meeting

25 October 2022

- **Management Committee (MC)**

- Security is important (crucial)
 - To manage risks and maintain confidence in the Peppol network
 - Risks – protect against attacks, threats, abuse
 - Confidence – Peppol’s credibility and reputation running trusted and safe network
- Security required by new Service Provider (SP) Agreement
 - SPs must comply with minimum security requirements set out in the Internal Regulations (IR) and/or Operational Procedures (OP).



Generally



Specifically

- **Working Group (WG)**

- Objective
 - Develop a proposal for Peppol Security Requirements to ensure there is a **consistent, minimum** level of security across the Peppol network.
 - MC decision that **End Users are out-of-scope**
- Outcomes / Deliverables
 - Propose Security Requirements
 - Lodge a Request for Change (RFC)
 - RFC will be managed by the Agreements, Policies, and Procedures Change Management Board (APPCMB) in accordance with the Peppol change management process.



Where are we now?



- **No universal security requirements** *SPs*
 - Mentioned in new Agreements (but no detail)
 - Different security requirements across regions
 - Peppol Authorities (PAs) Specific Requirements
 - Differences makes it difficult for SPs
- **Inconsistent security verification** *PAs*
 - Some PAs verify security controls directly
 - Some PAs rely on Standards (e.g. ISO27001)
 - Some PAs have no verification
- **End User Identification (EUI)** *End Users*
 - In Agreements/IR
- **Transport Security** *Network*
 - TLS 1.2 between C2 and C3

Where do we want to be?

- **Clearly defined security requirements** *“bar”*
 - No need for local PA specific requirements (PASR)
 - Security is consistent across Peppol network
 - Security can be centrally managed and monitored
 - Peppol can respond to emerging risks and threats
- **Consistent security verification** *Easy to verify*
 - Verification can be easily done by all PAs
 - SPs can operate across jurisdictions
 - Enforcement in place to ensure compliance
- **EUI**
 - No change
- **Transport Security**
 - No change

• Aspiration

- Want a high security “bar”
 - Essential for future of Peppol
- Want a level playing field
 - Uniform, thorough, provable
- Want mandatory & enforceable

• Reality

- Just set a minimum security “bar”
 - So that it is generally acceptable
- Allow some choices
 - To meet legal, regional, industry requirements
- Keep recommendations simple
 - Easy to understand and specify

14 Meetings

- SPs, PAs, technology providers, OO
- Europe, Singapore, AU, NZ

Huge topic, intense discussions

100s of hours of out-of-hours work
Many trade-offs and compromises



Mature PAs
(want a strong security mandate, may have PA specific requirements)



Some SPs
(worried about cost)

Mature SPs
(want lots of security)


Balancing Act


Some PAs
(worried about time, cost, and lack of security expertise)


PA – Peppol Authority
SP – Service Provider
OO – OpenPeppol Operating Office
MC – OpenPeppol Managing Committee

Conceptual scatter plot of Peppol SPs

Significant ISO27001 experience in AU







Discussion Areas (9)

More detail

Background Information


Recommendations

1. Network Operators (who?)



Recommendation #1 – Affected Entities

All SPs (run an AP or SMP) and OO services (internal or subcontracted) must meet the Peppol mandated minimum security requirements





Recommendation #2 – Security Controls


All SPs and OO must implement security controls for their Peppol Services


• Security is Required

- Cost – security part of business
 - ISO27001 audits start from €5K p.a.
 - Certification is good for business
- In Service Provider agreement

9.4.9. *Ensure that it has sufficient resources for the readiness, testing, operation and maintenance of its services according to the minimum service level requirements ...*

10.3. *The Parties shall use measures and procedures in accordance with accepted best industry practices to protect their own data systems used to perform this Agreement against illicit use, malicious code, viruses, computer intrusions, infringements and illegal tampering of data and other comparable actions by third parties.*





Recommendation #3 – Approved Information Security Frameworks


All SPs and OO must use an approved framework: ISO27001 or NIST or National Government

• Acceptable Frameworks

- ISO27001 (dominant, 2022 is NIST harmonised)
- Optional (PA decision)
 - NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF)
 - National Government (e.g. AU IRAP)

• Other Frameworks

- Complex, specialised, limited, country specific
 - Global – CIS, COBIT, COSO, CSA, ISF, MITR, PCI, SOC2...
 - Regional – ASD8, CMMC, ETSI, HITRUST, NCSC, PSR...



ISO27001

- International standard for Information Security
 - One of the ISO27000 family
- Requires an ISMS
 - InfoSec Management System
- Annex A – 93 Controls

Mandatory Requirements

- Scope [4.3]
- Risk assessment [6.12]
- Management
 - [5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 7.2, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3]
 - Risk, training, monitoring & measurement, internal audit, review, corrective actions

Service Controls

- Manage risk
- Implement
 - Policies & processes
- Collect evidence

Statement of Applicability (SoA)

- Which of 93 controls implemented
- Justify why others aren't implemented



Recommendation #4 – Evaluation by independent auditor/assessor


All SPs and OO must get their Peppol services and systems evaluated by an independent and accredited auditor or assessor

- **Acceptable**

- Independent auditor (ISO27001)
- Independent assessor (NIST, Gov)

- **Baseline controls?**

- Not necessary, as auditor/assessor will review risk assessment and control coverage





Recommendation #5 – Audit certificate or assessment report

All SPs and OO must ensure the completion of an independent audit or security assessment

- **ISO27001 – Certificate**

- Public, simple, “pass”
- Renewed each year





- **NIST, Gov – Report**

- Private, detailed, graded
- Review needs security expertise
- NIST maps onto ISO27001



Function	Category	ID	Subcategory	Informative References
Identify	Asset Management	ID.AM	ID.BE-1: The organization's role in the supply chain is identified and communicated	COBIT 5 APOC01.01, APOC01.02, APOC01.05, APOC01.06, APOC01.07, ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.15.1.1, A.15.1.2, A.15.1.3, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2
	Business Environment	ID.BE	ID.BE-2: The organization's place in critical infrastructure and its industry sector is identified and communicated	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, SA-12
	Communication	ID.CV	ID.BE-3: Priorities for organizational mission, objectives, and activities are established and communicated	COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
Protect	Risk Assessment	ID.RA	ID.BE-4: Dependencies and critical functions for delivery of critical services are established	COBIT 5 APO10.01, BADA04.02, BAO9.02, ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.2, A.11.2.3, A.11.3
	Risk Management Strategy	ID.RM	ID.BE-5: Resilience requirements to support delivery of critical services are established for all operating states (e.g. under duress/attack, during recovery, normal operations)	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-8, PE-9, PE-11, PM-8, SA-14
	Supply Chain Risk Management	ID.SC		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
Detect	Identity Management and Access Control	PR.AC		COBIT 5 APO10.01, BADA04.02, BAO9.02, ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.2, A.11.2.3, A.11.3
	Business and Training	PR.BT		NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-8, PE-9, PE-11, PM-8, SA-14
	Data Security	PR.DS		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
Respond	Information Protection Processes & Procedures	PR.IP		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
	Maintenance	PR.MA		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
	Protective Technology	PR.PT		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
Recover	Accounting and Events	DE.AE		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
	Security Continuous Monitoring	DE.CM		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
	Detection Processes	DE.DP		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
Communicate	Response Planning	RS.RP		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
	Communication	RS.CO		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
	Mitigation	RS.MI		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
Improve	Improvements	RS.IM		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
	Recovery Planning	RC.RP		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
	Recovery	RC.RV		COBIT 5 APOC02.06, APOC03.01, SA 62448-2-1-2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6





Recommendation #6 – Annual Attestation

All SPs and OO must provide a yearly attestation which includes the independent audit certificate or assessment report and commitments to remediation and ongoing security improvements.

- **Attestation**

- Information about organisation and service
 - Includes changes in circumstances or environment
 - Includes associated dependencies e.g. supply chain
- Provide independent audit/assessment
 - ISO27001 – certificate
 - NIST – independent assessor’s security report
 - Gov – government security report
- Declaration about ongoing remediation and security improvements

- **Process**

- Provide yearly
 - SPs to their PA, OO to MC
- Audit/assessment maybe an ongoing
 - SPs using ISO27001 over 3yrs
 - New SPs may show “in progress” and give timetable

- **Confidentiality**

- SP’s have a choice
 - ISO27001 certificate – just general certificate
 - NIST, Gov – need to provide report



Recommendation #7 – Peppol Authority Evaluation

PA determines an SP attestation's acceptability. MC evaluates the OO attestation. PA has the right to demand more information or reject an attestation.

- **Acceptability**

- PAs may question an attestation
 - If the auditor/assessor is unacceptable
 - If scope of audit/assessment is unacceptable
- PAs may ask for more info
 - E.g. if certification is “in progress”
 - E.g. if assessment is incomplete e.g. dashboards of coverage and effectiveness
- PAs may reject an attestation
 - If SP refuses to meet requirements

- **Verification**

- ISO27001 – evaluation is simple (yes/no)
- NIST, Gov – optional for PA
 - Security expertise is required if PA chooses to accept NIST or Government security assessments

- **MC Role**

- MC evaluates OO attestation
- MC adjudicates if a PA operates an AP or SMP
- MC needs to collect yearly report from PAs



Recommendation #8 – Enforcement

PAs report to OpenPeppol. The SPs have the right to escalate. Failure to conform will result in revoking of Peppol certificate .

- **Pass**

- PA's provide list of SPs to OpenPeppol
- SPs or OO continue as usual



- **Escalation**

- Non-compliance operational procedure
 - PA notifies OpenPeppol of a problem SP
 - SPs can appeal
- MC intervenes if OO fails

- **Enforcement**

- SP's AP or SMP certificate revoked
- Or certificate won't be renewed (2-year cycle)



Recommendation #9 – Ongoing Security Committee

Establish an ongoing dedicated security committee to provide oversight, advice, review, planning and investigation of security related issues and concerns in the Peppol network

- **Ongoing Review**

- Review security “bar” and process
 - Investigate program effectiveness
 - May need to produce guidelines
 - Look at specifying mandatory controls

- **Advice**


- Provide expert opinion
 - Resource for MC, PAs, SPs
- Investigate broader security topics
 - Security options for C1/C4
 - Security trends & emerging risks
 - Security differences between regions

- **Governance**

- Provide oversight of Peppol operations
 - Security in eDelivery Standards (e.g. HTTPS for SMP)
 - Security of OO related services (e.g. central reporting)
 - Approval of particular national government framework
- Provide input to planning
 - Security budget for OO needs increasing
 - Security implications of alliances (e.g. EESPA interconnection)
- Provide input to strategy for Peppol’s future
 - E.g. CTC is going to demand high levels of security
 - E.g. Interconnecting to other networks - higher security
 - E.g. Becoming international requires higher security

Summary and Next Steps

Proposal
Migration Plan
Questions





Recommendation #10 – Migration Plan

Make high priority, allow transition, ensure ongoing security committee



<i>Working Group (WG)</i>	Formulate proposal Agree on recommendations	Submit RFC (doc req, changes to IR and OP, migration plan with dates)		Ongoing Security Committee Ongoing review
<i>eDelivery Providers (SPs + OO)</i>	Provide feedback to WG	Provide feedback to APPCMB	Submit “progress” reports Obtain assessment Submit attestation	Yearly attestations
<i>Peppol Authorities (PAs)</i>	Provide feedback to WG	Provide feedback to APPCMB	Evaluate Allow “working progress”	Collect yearly attestations Evaluate Enforce (SPs and OO)
<i>Open Peppol Governance</i>	Co-ordinating Committee - convene WG & set scope	APPCMB consultation APPCMB recommendation MC Approval	MC establish ongoing security committee	MC Escalation OO Enforcement (certs)
<i>Timeframe</i>	2022	Mid 2023	Late 2023 (“promise”)	Late 2024

- **Next Step (RFC)**

- Security Requirements

- Entities – SPs (APs, SMPs) and OO (supporting eDelivery services)
 - Controls – ISO27001, NIST, Government
 - Audit – independently, accredited
 - Attestation – yearly
 - Enforcement – Peppol X.509 certificates

- Migration Plan

- Transition end of 2023 – allowing “in progress”

- Ongoing Security Committee

- Provide on-going review, updates, advice, and planning

- **Questions?**

